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COMMENTS
REPAYMENT OF CLAIM OF RIGHT INCOME BY AN
ESTATE UNDER SECTION 1341
Under the "claim of right" doctrine a taxpayer is required to report in-
come received by him, under a claim of right and without restriction as to
its disposition, even though the taxpayer's claim to the income was invalid
and even though he is required to repay the sum in whole or in part in a year
subsequent to its receipt. The historical basis for the doctrine is found in
North American Oil v. Burnet.1 The Court stated by way of dictum, that if
the taxpayer is required in a later year to repay the sum reported under a
claim of right, he is entitled to a deduction in the year of repayment.2 The
repayment of a claim of right item was dealt with by Congress for the first
time in section 1341 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The purpose of
this Comment is to review the question under section 1341 of the repayment
of an amount of money by the estate of the taxpayer who received such amount
under a claim of right.
The principle of a deduction in the year of repayment announced by
way of dictum in North American Oil was solidified by United States v.
Lewis.3 The Court in Lewis held that where a taxpayer reported a bonus
as income in one year and was required to restore the bonus to his employer
in a later year, the taxpayer's only remedy was to take a deduction in the
year of repayment. He could not recompute his income for the year in which
he received the bonus. The prohibition against recomputation for the year of
receipt is grounded on the principle that the tax system is based on an annual
accounting period, requiring the determination of income at the end of the
year without regard to subsequent events.
4
The Lewis case and the principle on which it is based are quite sound,
but in practice, quite inequitable. A taxpayer in a high tax bracket may be
required to pay tax at a high rate on a substantial sum received under a claim
of right. However, if the taxpayer is required to repay that sum in a later
year, he may be in a lower tax bracket or have little or no income against
which to apply the deduction. The benefit of the deduction is less than the
tax paid on the item in the year of receipt. That Congress recognized this
1. 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
2. Id. at 424 (dictum).
3. 340 U.S. 590 (1951).
4. Haberkorn v. United States, 173 F.2d 587 (6th Cir. 1949).
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obvious inequity is evidenced by the House and Senate committee reports. 5
The reports state that "the deduction allowable in the later year does not
compensate the taxpayer adequately for the tax paid in the earlier year."
As a result, section 1341 was enacted, 7 allowing the taxpayer to pay as his
tax for the year of restoration the lesser of (1) the tax for the year of repay-
ment computed by deducting the amount of the repayment or (2) the tax
for such year computed without deduction for the repayment minus the lesser
tax he would have paid in the earlier year of receipt, if he had excluded the
claim of right item from his income in that earlier year. If the decrease in
the prior year's tax by excluding the item exceeds the tax for the year of
repayment without the deduction, then the excess is refunded or credited as
if it were an overpayment for the taxable year of repayment.8 The section
permits the taxpayer to offset the tax paid on the claim of right item against
the tax assessed for the year of repayment.
Suppose, however, that a taxpayer receives a claim of right item, pays
the tax thereon and dies. A third party then sues the estate on the ground
that the decedent's claim to the amount was invalid. The third party is suc-
cessful and the estate restores the item. May the estate avail itself of the
relief provided by section 1341? That the estate may do so was announced
in four recent decisions, Killeen v. United States,9 Estate of Kurt Koehler v.
United States,'0 Estate of Samuel Stein" and Estate of Charles Good v.
United States.12 The first two cases do not discuss the issue, the third only
by way of dictum and the fourth, pregnant with errors, meets the issue
squarely.
In the Stein case, certain stockholders of a corporation diverted sums
from the corporation which were not reported as income by them or by the
corporation. In prior proceedings, 18 it was determined that the payments from
the corporation to the stockholders were taxable income to the corporation
and corporate distributions taxable to the stockholders. It was further deter-
mined that the payments were received by the stockholders under a claim
of right. The Government sought to reach the sums diverted to satisfy the
corporation's tax on the ground of transferred liability. The court held that
the Government was not estopped from asserting transferred liability by
reason of the prior decision that the payments were corporate distributions
5. S. RE. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 118 (1954).
6. Ibid.
7. The Internal Revenue Code of 1939 did not contain a comparable provision.
8. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1341(b) (1).
9. 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. f 9351 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
10. 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9303 (D. Ore. 1962).
11. 37 T.C. 945 (1962).
12. 208 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
13. Esther M. Stein, 25 T.C. 940 (1956).
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taxable to the stockholders. One of the stockholders was deceased and his
estate was a party to the suit. The estate sought to recover by equitable re-
coupment the amount of the taxes and additions to tax paid by the decedent
on the diverted sums. The court denied equitable recoupment declaring that
the remedy at law was adequate. Section 1341 could be used by the estate
to recover the tax paid on the diverted sums. The court stated:
If a taxpayer restored sums received under a claim of right and died,
his estate could obtain the tax credit provided in section 1341 on
behalf of the taxpayer. Since an estate is liable for its decedent's
taxes, it is also entitled to credits owing to the decedent. We there-
fore find that the taxpayer's estate is entitled to the relief afforded
by section 1341 if all the other requirements of that provision have
been met.
14
Although the above quoted statement was dictum, the court clearly took
the position that the estate was entitled to the relief provided in section 1341.
In the Good case the taxpayer-decedent received certain salaries and
expense reimbursements from his employer and paid the tax thereon in 1952
and 1953. In 1955 his employer notified him that a substantial part of the
sums received were improperly paid to him and that he would be held liable
for repayment. However, the decedent died before such repayment was made.
The employer filed a claim against the estate and was paid in 1956. In the
estate tax return filed for that year of repayment a deduction was claimed
from the gross estate for the sum repaid to the employer. The deduction was
allowed. The estate also filed its fiduciary income tax return and claimed a
refund under section 1341 with respect to the tax paid on the amount it re-
stored to the employer. The claim was rejected. The estate then brought suit
for the refund under the authority of section 1341(b) (1).
The issue in the case was whether the estate of the taxpayer-decedent
could avail itself of the benefits of 1341, having repaid the sum which the
taxpayer-decedent had reported as income in 1952 and 1953. The court held
that the estate was so entitled. It would seem that the result reached by the
court is an equitable one; however, there seems to be no sound legal basis for it.
The first question raised by an objective interpretation of section 1341
is whether the plain language of the statute includes the estate of the tax-
payer as well as the taxpayer himself. The language used in the section seems
to contemplate one taxpayer. Section 1341 (a) (1) reads in terms of "the tax-
payer" including a claim of right item in his income and 1341 (a) (2) in
terms of "the taxpayer" obtaining a deduction in a later year because it was
discovered that his claim was invalid. The section, reasonably interpreted,
can be paraphrased as follows: (1) if taxpayer A includes a claim of right
14. 37 T.C. at 958 (dictum).
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item in his income and, (2) if a deduction is allowable to taxpayer A because
he discovered in a later year that his claim was invalid, then he is entitled
to use section 1341 if all other requirements of the section are met. In other
words, the taxpayer who intends to use section 1341 must be the same tax-
payer who included the item in his income. For federal income tax purposes,
estates of deceased persons are regarded as distinct and separate taxable
entities.' 5 When the decedent included the item in his income and the estate
repaid it after his death, the acts of two separate taxpayers were involved.
Furthermore, the estate as "the taxpayer" in section 1341 (a) (2) could not
be the same as "the taxpayer" in section 1341 (a)(1) since the estate was
not in existence in the prior year to include the item in its income. Therefore,
since a taxpayer and his estate are two separate taxpayers and section 1341
contemplates one taxpayer, it would seem to follow that the estate is not
entitled to the benefits of section 1341 because it did not include the item
in its income.
It is doubtful that Congress intended to include the estate within the
words "the taxpayer" as used in the section.16 The court in the Good case
admitted that the section "gives no specific indication whether the taxpayer's
estate should be included within the meaning of the word taxpayer; and its
legislative history is not illuminating."'1 7 It might be added that the Treasury
Department Regulations are silent on the matter. Yet, in view of these argu-
ments to the contrary, the Good case held the estate to be within the purview
of the statute. The court's reason for so holding is not clear. Perhaps the
court's reason for finding that the estate was included within the term "the
taxpayer" may be found in the following statement: "I take the view that
when Congress passed Section 1341 it did not intend to recognize a debt of
the [G]overnment to the taxpayer during his lifetime and deny the same
obligation to his personal representatives and to his estate."' 8
A second issue is raised by the language used in section 1341. Specifically,
does section 1341 (a) (2) itself provide a deduction, not otherwise provided
by the Code, where it is established that the taxpayer did not have a valid
claim to the item included in income in the prior year? It is believed that the
section does not authorize a deduction.19 The section states:
15. 4 CCH 1958 STAND. FED. TAX REP. f[ 3605.01.
16. Contra, Samuel Stein, 37 T.C. 945 (1962). The court concluded that "Samuel's
estate is encompassed within the term 'the taxpayer' as it appears in Section 1341." Id.
at 958 (dictum).
17. 208 F. Supp. at 522.
18. Id. at 523.
19. See Webster, The Claim of Right Doctrine: 1954 Version, 10 TAX L. REV.
381 (1955) ; Cavanaugh, Income Received Under Claim of Right As Affected By Section
1341, P-H OIL & GAS TAXES ff 4013; 5 RABKIN & JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME GIFT AND




(2) a deduction is allowable for the taxable year because it was
established after the close of such prior taxable year (or years)
that the taxpayer did not have an unrestricted right to such item
or to a portion of such item . . .20
The wording is conditional. In other words, a taxpayer may use section 1341
if, but only if, a deduction is allowable elsewhere in the Code. Also, the Regu-
lations under section 1341 make it clear that no new deduction is granted by
that section. They state that the section applies if ". . . the taxpayer is entitled
under other provisions of ... the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to a de-
duction of more than $3,000 because of the restoration to another of an item
which was included in the taxpayers gross income for a prior taxable year...
under a claim of right .... -21 Under prior law, it was beyond question that
the repayment of a claim of right item gave rise to a deduction; however,
such a deduction did not automatically lie, but would be allowed only where
the item fitted into one of the established deduction sections.22 It might be
noted that many of the cases which state that a deduction is allowed upon
repayment do not cite any deduction section, including the North American
Oil case and the Lewis case.
23
Both North American Oil and Lewis were decided before the enactment
of section 1341. Since then, especially in view of the express requirement of
the Regulations above quoted, it is quite clear that a taxpayer must seek his
deduction for the repayment under a separate section of the Code. Assuming
that the estate is entitled to use section 1341, it must look to another section
of the Code for authority to deduct the repayment of a claim of right item.
It seems that only section 691(b) provides a deduction for the estate. It pro-
vides that any deduction under sections 162, 163, 164, 212, or 611 which is
not properly allowable to the decedent during his last taxable period shall
be allowable to the estate, if it is liable to discharge the obligation.
2 4 If the
repayment of a claim of right item is an expense, then it would be deductible
under section 691(b), since that section includes section 162.
20. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1341(a) (2).
21. Treas. Reg. § 1.1341-1(a)(1) (1957). (Emphasis added.)
22. Webster, op. cit. supra note 19.
23. See Anderson v. Bowers, 117 F. Supp. 884 (W.D.S.C. 1954). It is interesting
to note that the court in the Anderson case made the following statement:
Therefore, when the Internal Revenue Code does not provide for the "claim of
right" doctrine, but the courts decide that equitable considerations necessitate its
use, equitable considerations should be entertained when sums are refunded after
being received under the "claim of right" doctrine.
Id. at 892. In permitting a deduction for the repayment of a claim of right item, the court
reasons that since authority for the inclusion of a claim of right item does not appear in
the Code, statutory authority for its deduction upon repayment is unnecessary. The case
was decided prior to the enactment of section 1341.
24. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 691(b) (1) (A).
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If the estate seeks its deduction under section 691 (b), then the Govern-
ment's main contention in the Good case must be controverted. The Gov-
ernment argued that the estate could not use section 1341 because section
64 2 (g) prohibits a double deduction.2 5 An estate may not deduct an item
under section 2053 or 2054 from both its estate tax and income tax. The
estate in the Good case deducted the amount repaid to the employer from its
estate tax under section 2 053(a) (3) as a claim against the estate. The estate
then sought to deduct the tax paid on the item from its income tax under
1341. The Government argued that the estate was taking a double deduction
by seeking deductions from both its estate tax and income tax.
The problem of applying section 691 (b) and 642(g) was solved by the
court in Good by using a distinction which has very little merit and by mis-
interpreting section 1341. The court's misinterpretation of section 1341 is
shown by the following statement: "Section 1341 gives the taxpayer the
option of either receiving the sum that was actually overpaid in prior years
or permitting the taxpayer to take the sum returned as a deduction .... "2
The court is saying that the taxpayer has an option of choosing either
section 1341 (a) (5) (receiving the sum that was actually overpaid) or section
1341 (a) (4) (taking the sum returned as a deduction). It would seem that the
court misinterpreted the section. The provisions of 1341 are mandatory; they
provide no option to the taxpayer.2 7 The section reads that the tax for the
taxable year (year of repayment) "shall be the lesser of" 28 the tax computed
with such deduction or the tax computed without such deduction minus the
decrease in tax for the year of receipt had the taxpayer not included the item
in his income. The taxpayer must use the lesser of the taxes; he has no
alternative.
However, the court distinguishes the two alternatives which it says
the taxpayer has, stating that ". . . the deduction allowed under section 1341
is only an alternative to taking a straight tax credit, the relief sought in this
case. Therefore, the tax credit given by section 1341 is not controlled by sec-
tion 642 (g) and 691(b) .'29 The first portion of the above quotation which
reads "the deduction allowed under section 1341" is incorrect, because the
section does not provide a deduction. The "tax credit" of which the court
25. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 642(g). The section provides, in part:
DISALLOWANCE OF DOUBLE DE.ucTIONs. Amounts allowable under section 2053
or 2054 as a deduction in computing the taxable estate of a decedent shall not be
allowed as a deduction in computing the taxable income of the estate....
26. 208 F. Supp. at 523. (Emphasis added.)
27. Austin, Surrey, Warren, Winokur, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Tax
Accounting, 68 HARV. L. REV. 257, 279 (1955); 2 MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION, § 12.106a (1961).
28. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1341 (a) (3).
29. 208 F. Supp. at 523.
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speaks is the decrease in tax, computed under section 1341 (a) (5) (B), which
exceeded the tax imposed for the current year.30 This excess may be re-
funded as an overpayment under section 1341 (b) (1). The crucial error com-
mitted by the court was its finding that section 1341 (a) (4) is a deduction
while section 1341 (a) (5) (B) is a tax credit.31 On the basis of this dis-
tinction, the court further reasoned that since the estate was seeking relief
under section 1341(a) (5) and (b) (1) it was seeking a tax credit and not
a deduction. 32 Therefore, since a deduction was not involved, there could be
no double deduction under section 6 4 2(g). Furthermore, since it was seeking
a tax credit rather than a deduction, the estate was not required to use sec-
tion 691 (b).3 On the basis of this reasoning, the court concluded that the
issue of section 6 4 2 (g) and 691(b) was not before it and therefore need not
be decided.
4
It is submitted that the court's analysis of the section is unsound. If the
court's distinction were followed to its logical conclusion, then an estate re-
quired to use the deduction under section 1341 (a) (4) would be exposed to
the double deduction provision of section 6 42(g). On the other hand, an
estate repaying an item and required to compute its tax under section
1341 (a) (5) would not be prohibited by section 6 42 (g) because it would not
be seeking a deduction, but a tax credit. Furthermore, an estate seeking
a deduction under section 1341 (a) (4) would be required to meet the re-
quirements of the deduction sections listed under section 691(b) since, ac-
cording to the Good case, it would be seeking a deduction. However, another
estate required to use 1341 (a) (5) would find it unnecessary to utilize section
691 (b) because it would be seeking a tax credit and not a deduction. Estates
repaying claim of right items would be exposed to different tax consequences
depending on whether they would be required to use section 1341 (a) (4)
or 1341 (a) (5). Since the provisions of the statute are mandatory, estates
performing the same acts and utilizing the same section would be treated
differently. It is difficult to believe that Congress desired such an anomalous
result. The section, the Regulations and the congressional committee reports
make no mention of a "tax credit."
The fault in the reasoning of the Good case lies in the court's contention
that section 1341 provides the taxpayer with an option and that a tax credit
exists under its provisions. It is submitted that section 1341 (a) (5), the
court's supposed tax credit provision, merely provides a method of computa-
30. Whether such computation under section 1341 (a) (5) (B) provides a "tax
credit" is debatable.






tion whereby the tax for the current year is reduced by the tax paid on the
item in the year of receipt. This computation method insures the taxpayer
that he will receive a tax benefit from the reduction equal to the tax paid on
the claim of right item when it was included in income, by taking into
consideration the tax bracket for that year of inclusion. The very purpose for
the section's enactment was to relieve taxpayers who under prior law could
only take a deduction in the year of repayment, although tax rates may have
been higher in the year of receipt than in the year of repayment.
The court's finding that an option and a tax credit are provided for in
section 1341 permitted it to completely bypass the crucial question of the
interrelationship of sections 6 4 2 (g), 691(b) and 1341. This Comment
will now address itself to the problem of this interrelationship.
It is first necessary to assume, as the Good case held, that the language of
section 1341 includes a taxpayer's estate. As was noted above, the language
of 1341 requires that a taxpayer be entitled to a deduction under other pro-
visions of the Internal Revenue Code. Therefore, the estate must seek its
deduction elsewhere.
Section 691 (b) provides such authority for an estate. Of the possibilities
for deductions under section 691(b), the deduction for the estate could only
lie in sections 162 or 212-business and non-business expenses. In Grand-
view Mines v. Commissioner,3 5 a mineral lease provided that the lessee was
to pay to the lessor-taxpayer royalties measured by a percentage of the sales
value of the products extracted from mines. In 1950, the original lease was
amended to provide that in lieu of the fixed royalties, the lessor would
receive 50% of the net profits of operation. Thereafter, the lease was further
amended to provide that the lessor's share be reduced to 46%%, which
amendment was retroactive to January 1, 1950. To adjust for this retro-
active amendment, the lessor paid $18,957.00 to the lessee as an overpayment
to it of the 1950 royalties. This amount had been previously included in the
lessor's income. It is significant that in this case the court indicated that the
repayment had to qualify as a business expense to be deductible.3 6 Admittedly,
the court found that the lessor received the sum under an absolute right rather
than a claim of right. However, nowhere in the Good case does the court
indicate that the decedent received the amounts therein under a claim of
right. From the facts as they appear in the Good case, it can be argued that
the decedent received them under an absolute right, since it appears that
there was no controversy in the year of receipt. Therefore, the court could
have reasonably required the estate to seek its deduction as an expense item
under 691 (b). There is authority for the proposition that the repayment
35. 32 T.C. 759 (1959), aft'd, 282 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1960).
36. Id. at 771.
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of a claim of right item could be an expense. In United States v. Simon,S7
three members of a partnership formed a corporation. The partnership and
the corporation entered into a lease whereby the former leased certain premises
to the latter at a rental of 6 percent of the corporation's gross sales. In 1943
the partnership orally agreed to refund to the corporation any amounts paid
in excess of the amount allowed by the Commissioner as a deduction from
the corporation's income. In 1944 the Commissioner disallowed rental ex-
pense in excess of 44 percent for the year 1943. The two parties then
modified the lease to show the rental at 44 percent and the partnership in
1944 repaid the excess amount paid by the corporation in 1943. The court
held that the refund was not deductible from the partnership's or the partners'
1944 income tax returns because the repayment was voluntary. The court
pointed out that the agreement to make repayment (the modification of the
lease) was made after the fiscal year in which the rentals had been paid,
and could not operate to reduce the rental income based on 6 percent. Since
the partnership was under no obligation to repay the rentals, the repayment
could not be considered as a necessary expense in carrying on a business.
It is clear that, had the agreements been in force in 1943, the repayment of
the claim of right rentals would have qualified as an expense. Therefore, in
any case where the repayment of a claim of right item by an estate is deemed
to be an expense, it would be difficult for the Government to argue that there
is a double deduction under section 642 (g). Section 691 (b) clearly provides
authority for the deduction of business expenses. It is in effect an exception
of the double deduction provisions of section 642(g).
The above approach could not be utilized by all estates repaying claim
of right items. This is because many of the cases state that the claim of right
item may be deducted as a loss. 38 However, this rationale is difficult to accept.
If a taxpayer receives $10,000 in one year and is required to repay it in another,
it would seem that such a transaction is a wash-out rather than a loss. A loss
means a loss of property ;39 while in the above example, no property is lost.
37. 281 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1960).
38. See Sangston Hettler, 16 T.C. 528, 534 (1951) ; Maurice P. O'Meara, 8 T.C.
622, 634 (1947) ; Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278 (1953). In the Healy case the
issue was whether allowance for the repayment should be made by a recomputation of
income for the year of receipt or a deduction in the year of repayment. The Government
argued against the former method but conceded that the taxpayer was entitled to a
deduction for a loss in the year of repayment.
39. See Giurlani & Bros. v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1941) ; 5
METE rs, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 28.05 (1961); Walker v. Thomas,
75 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1935) ; Boney v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 213 N.C. 543, 196 S.E.
837 (1938).
The court in the Boney case stated that "a loss to a person as understood in business
is either a decrease in the value of his resources or an increase in his liabilities." Id. at
546, 196 S.E. at 841. Also, the court in the Walker case stated: "[B]ut ordinarily where
the thing itself-the property-is held intact, undiminished in quantity and unchanged in
[ Vol. 69
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If, however, the repayment by the estate were considered a loss, then the estate
could not deduct it under section 691 (b), since section 165 losses are not cov-
ered under 691(b). The anomalous situation could arise where the taxpayer,
had he lived to repay the item, could take the deduction as a loss, while his es-
tate under the same set of facts could not. Yet, an estate repaying a claim of
right item deemed to be an expense could take the deduction. An approach
which provides a deduction only where the repayment is considered an ex-
pense, but not a loss, is hardly an adequate solution for estates repaying claim
of right items. Whether the restoration is an expense or a loss is immaterial.
What is important is that the estate is repaying an item of income which was
not included in its own income.
It is important to note that the Government has not appealed the
decisions in any of the four recent cases above mentioned ruling in favor of
estates. Apparently, the Government has conceded the point that estates are
entitled to the benefits of section 1341. Therefore, an approach must be
found which will provide equal treatment to all estates repaying claim of
right items. This approach could be accomplished by an amendment to the
Regulations under section 1341. The purpose of such an amendment would be
to provide that an estate, or any other taxpayer repaying the item, may
utilize section 1341 in all cases where the decedent-taxpayer would have been
so entitled had he lived to repay the item. As a condition precedent to the
estate utilizing the section, the court would first have to decide whether the
decedent-taxpayer could have met all the requirements of section 1341. If
the decedent could have deducted the item either as an expense or loss and
therefore, utilize the section, then the estate would also be so entitled. This
approach would apply the same principles regardless of who repaid the
amount and regardless of whether it was considered an expense or a loss.
It would eliminate the requirement that the estate must first seek its de-
duction under section 691 (b). Such an approach would also eliminate the
double deduction problem under section 642(g). It would provide an excep-
tion to the double deduction prohibition, just as section 691(b) does now.
40
Since the same principles would be applied in all cases, the amendment would
provide for simple and uniform application, a most desirable characteristic. It
would be fair to both the estate and the Government. Certainly, the estate,
as the taxpayer's successor in interest, should not be denied the benefit of
character (and that is true here), no loss can be properly said to have occurred." 75 F.2d
at 669.
40. Good v. United States, 208 F.2d 521 (E.D. Mich. 1962). The court stated:
"Section 642(g) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 ... permits an item to be
deducted both on the estate tax return and on the estate's fiduciary income tax return




section 1341 simply because the taxpayer's death intervened between the
receipt and the repayment of the item.
The court in the Good case pointed out that if section 1341 applies to
an estate, certain adjustments would have to be made. The court stated
that "if the estate is successful in this action, the sum recovered will be in-
cluded in the taxable estate of Charles E. Good."' 41 The sum recovered in
Good was $6,873.97 computed under section 1341 (a) (5) and refunded under
section 1341(b)(1). That this adjustment is necessary may be illustrated
by the following example. Assume that a taxpayer includes $10,000 in his
income under a claim of right and pays tax thereon at the rate of 20%. When
he dies, the full $10,000 is not poured into his gross estate, but only $8,000
is included because he paid $2,000 tax on the item. This $8,000 will then be
added to the other assets in the decedent's gross estate. In the Good case, the
estate deducted from the gross estate the full amount of the claim of right item
and the deduction was allowed. If the same is permitted in our example, the
estate will deduct the full $10,000 upon its repayment. However, this results in
reducing the gross estate by $2,000 from what it would have been had the
decedent never received the item. If the estate had no income in the year of
restoration, the $2,000 tax paid on the item in the year of receipt would be
refunded to the estate under section 1341(b)(1). This amount would then
be added to the gross estate to increase it to what it would have been had the
decedent never received the item. The Good case makes this adjustment by
including the $6,873.97 refund in the gross estate. The principle involved here-
in requires that whenever the repayment is allcwed as a deduction from the
gross estate, the value of the benefit derived from the application of section
1341 must be included in the gross estate. This will prevent the estate from
being in a better financial position than it would have been had the decedent
never included the item in income. This coincides with the underlying princi-
ple of section 1341, namely, to restore the taxpayer to the status quo with-
out an unwarranted gain to either the taxpayer or the Government.
Provisions for the same adjustment found necessary in the Good case
would be necessary in any amendment to the Regulations discussed above.
The same principle would apply for the same reasons. However, the Regula-
tions would also have to provide that no adjustment is necessary if the
estate tax return had not been previously filed. This was not the situation
in the Good case since the estate tax return had been filed prior to the suit.
For example, assume that a taxpayer has no claim of right item but a salary
of $50,000. He pays tax thereon at the rate of 20%. As a result, $40,000
will be poured into his estate at his death. If the value of his other assets
41. Id. at 523.
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are $50,000, the gross estate will be $90,000. On the other hand, assume that
the same taxpayer receives $10,000 under a claim of right in addition to the
$50,000 salary. He pays 20% tax on the total $60,000, resulting in $48,000
being poured into his estate at his death. The gross estate stands at $98,000
but the estate tax return has not been filed. To eliminate the necessity of an
adjustment by adding the benefit of the value derived under section 1341, the
estate would be permitted to deduct only $8,000 from the gross estate
($10,000 claim of right item minus $2,000 tax paid thereon). This deduction
reduces the gross estate to $90,000, what it would have been had the tax-
payer never received the claim of right item. No refund, or any other value
derived from the application of section 1341 need be included in the decedent's
gross estate. The principle is that the sum deducted from the gross estate is
the amount of the claim of right item reduced by the tax attributable to it.
In either case, whether or not an adjustment is necessary, the estate as the
"taxpayer" in section 1341 is restored to its previous financial position, re-
sulting in a solution fair to both the Government and the decedent's estate.
CONCLUSION
Several conclusions may be drawn from the above discussion of the Good
case's application of section 1341 to estates. It would seem that every con-
sideration which prompted Congress to enact section 1341 to give relief to
taxpayers repaying claim of right items, dictates the application of the section
to estates. An estate repaying a claim of right item is certainly in no better
financial position after having restored the item. However, a denial of the
benefits of the section would place an estate in a worse financial position,
since the tax paid on the item would never be poured into the gross estate.
The allowance permitted by the Commissioner prior to the Good case was a
deduction from the value of the gross estate. This did not fully compensate
the estate for its restoration. It relegated the estate to the remedy available
under prior law, as dictated by the Lewis case. Therefore, it may be con-
cluded that the decision in the Good case was an equitable one.
However, had the court in the Good case decided that section 1341 was
not applicable to estates, it would have been on much stronger legal ground.
There is no language in the section, its legislative history or the Treasury
Regulations indicating that Congress intended to include estates within its
coverage. It would have been a simple matter for Congress to state that for
the application of section 1341, the term "taxpayer" includes the taxpayer's
estate. It could have been that the legislature failed to foresee the importance
of the section to an estate making a repayment. This oversight would be un-
derstandable, considering that the section is most frequently utilized by the
gas and oil industry. Furthermore, the reasoning of the court in the Good
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case appears to be unsound. There is no evidence to support the court's find-
ing that an option and a "tax credit" exist under the provisions of the section.
The court's decision would have been on solid legal ground if the estate was
denied the benefit of using section 1341 or required to seek a deduction
under 691 (b). If either of these alternatives had been adopted, the Govern-
ment may have been prompted to amend the Treasury Regulations, since the
estates plight would have been clearly illustrated.
In light of the recent decisions adverse to the Government, and the fact
that no appeal was taken in any of them, it may be concluded that the Govern-
ment has accepted the position that the section has application to the estate
of a taxpayer. As discussed above, an amendment to the Regulations would
solve the problem of the application of sections 691(b) and 642(c). Also,
by providing for proper adjustments to be made on the estate tax return,
the amendment would prevent any unjust enrichment which might occur by
the application of section 1341. The holding in the Good case and a proper
amendment to the Regulations would provide for the smooth operation of
section 1341.
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